Divine Hiddenness of a good god?
Plantinga argues that a knowledge of God can be used as justification for believing in God’s existence, even without evidence or argument.
She is sometimes made aware, catches a glimpse, of something of the overwhelming beauty and loveliness of the Lord; she is often aware, as it strongly seems to her, of the work of the Holy Spirit in her heart, comforting, encouraging, teaching, leading her to accept the “great things of the gospel” (as Edwards calls them), helping her see that the magnificent scheme of salvation devised by the Lord himself is not only for others but for her as well. After long, hard, conscientious reflection, this all seems to her enormously more convincing than the complaints of the critics. Is she then going contrary to duty in believing as she does? Is she being irresponsible? Clearly not. . . . She could be wrong . . . in thinking these things; nevertheless, she isn’t flouting any discernible duty. She is fulfilling her epistemic responsibilities; she is doing her level best; she is justified. http://www.baylor.edu/content/services/document.php/39957.pdf
However, this leaves us with the problem of those (like myself) who do not see, though they have asked…
Would a good/loving/compassionate/benevolent God prevent reasonable non-belief?
Or as Nietzsche’s asked: “a god who is all-knowing and all-powerful and who does not even make sure his creatures understand his intentions — could that be a god of goodness?”